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Abstract 
J groups of 48 female high school students were presented 
with varying amounts of input stimuli (6, 8, or 10 nouns) in an 
intentional concept-formation task, and were later tested for 
recall of incidental stimuli and identification of incidental 
concepts. Subjects within each group were divided into Jrds for 
information-processing ability from Schroder's Paragraph Comple-
tion Test, for authoritarianism from the California F Scale, and 
for intelligence from the SRA High School Placement Test. Anal-
ysis on each dependent variable included: (a) 3 two-way analyses 
of variance for information and conceptual level, or author-
itarianism, or intelligence, (b) 2 analyses of covariance 
between input and cognitive complexity or authoritarianism with 
intelligence as covariate, and (c) 2 analyses of covariance for 
input and authoritarianism or intelligence with complexity as 
covariate. Major results weres (a) no significant effects for 
integrative complexity, (b) low authoritarian persons performed 
better than other persons on the incidental task, with no differ-
ences on the intentional task, (c) intelligence had an effect on 
both types of learning, (d) a curvilinear relationship exists 
between quantity of relevant information and performance on the 
intentional task, and (e) added irrelevant material decreased 
incidental concept formation. The validity of Schroder's test 
was questioned; the suggestions that cognitive style affects 
processing of incidental stimuli, and that excessive input loads 
may cause a "jamming" of information systems were proposed. 
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Intentional and Incidental Concept Formation as 
a Function of Conceptual Structure, 
Information, Intelligence, and 
Authoritarianism 
David J. Marx 
Loyola University, Chicago 
The phenomenon of incidental learning involves the basic 
principles of selective discrimination and the immediate 
storage of environmental information. Experimental explora-
tion in this area has concentrated mainly on individual 
capabilities and response dispositions while ignoring the 
principles of response integration and associative strength. 
Specifically, conditions limiting an individual's response in 
a learning situation and the analysis of memory without the 
mobilization of instrumental acts have received widespread 
attention. Extensive explanations employ the concepts of 
differential cue-producing responses (Postman, 1964) and the 
omission of appropriate representational responses during 
stimulus presentation (Deese, 1964). 
The distinction between intentional and incidental 
learntng lacks precise formulation due to the vagueness of 
2 
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the operational definition for incidental learning. Initially, 
early investigators (Postrean & Senders, 1946; Underwood & 
Schulz, 1960) explained differences on the basis of set or 
an apparent state of subject preparedness. However, McGuigan 
(1958) discovered that "incidental" subjects often maintained 
an awareness of irrelevant cues through self-instructions or 
from characteristics of the presented material (McGeoch & 
Irion, 1952), In addition, Altra (1960) openly questioned 
the existence of "learning without awareness". As a result, 
operational procedures sustained revisions with Postman (1964) 
eventually concluding that incidental learning occurs by means 
of instructional stimuli only. Consequently, intentional 
learning is that type of learning occurring when subjects are 
explicitly instructed to note or memorize relevant stimuli. 
In contrast, incidental learning is operationally defined as 
that learning which occurs without specific designations to 
learn predetermined material. 
A thorough analysis of experimental evidence disclosed 
that several methodological difficulties exist in this area 
of investigation. Despite these complications, current research 
attempts to formulate appropriate explanatory concepts and 
to discover the functional properties of relevant variables. 
With regard to the former purpose, Tresselt and Mayzner (1960) 
and Mechanic (1962) supported Postman's hypothesis that 
incidental learning increases with the number of differential 
4. 
responses evoked by the stimulus. In the same realm, Mechanic 
(1962) proposed that performance of the intentional task inter-
feres with incidental learning because of task competition; 
and Miller and Lakso (1964) and Wray (1967) suggested that 
attention on material affects incidental learning with further 
clarification by Gutjahr (1958) that retention is not dependent 
upon intention to learn but upon sensory attention. Further-
more, Eagle and Leiter (1964) stated that intention to learn 
was only significant in that it generated adequate learning 
operations; and Quartermain and Scott (1960) concluded that 
relevance of material to the achievement of specified goals 
determines the type of stimuli incidentally learned. 
Silverstein (1964) discovered that associations emitted by 
intentional subjects were less conventional than those of 
incidental participants, while Dornbush and Winnick (1967) found 
that intentional learners actually employ more representational 
responses. In addition, Postman and Phillips (1954), Goldstein 
and Solomon (1955), Postman and Adams (1960), and Tatz (1960) 
have suggested that intentional and incidental learning are 
mediated by identical symbolic processes. Schneider and Kintz 
(1967) defined this process more precisely as one involving in-
struction stimuli, an orienting task, and attentiono In con-
trast, Rosenberg (1962) disconfirmed the hypothesis that 
incidental learning occurs through generalization of instruc-
tional stimuli or set (Dey, 1965);. while Nayzner and Tresselt 
(1962) demonstrated the effectiveness of high associative 
strength and small S-R distance upon recall in "incidental" 
tasks. 
5. 
Mechanic (1962) and Mechanic and D'Andrea (1966) disclosed 
that incidental learning increased as a function of the 
hypothesized number of pronounced replies demanded by the or-
ienting task; and Mechanic and Mechanic (1967) proposed 
equivalence between incidental and intentional learning when 
the task elicited pronouncing responses. Mechanic also 
described incidental learning as a more "selective" process in 
that such learners respond to fewer stimuli. Burnstein (1960) 
likewise discussed both types of learning as a function of 
selection processeso 
Finally, Restle and Emmerich (1966) stated that short-
term memory was the product of active recoding and Scandura and 
Roughead (1966) revealed that the quantity of recalled nouns was 
dependent upon recoding cues. Sommers (1967) supported the 
limited capacity hypothesis (Murdock, 1965) for both conditions 
of learning. This position states that individuals possess a 
limited capacity for immediate recall of information learned in 
a specified time periodo This result may occur due to limi-
tations placed on the rate of processing information. 
Another aim of recent research is to examine the functional 
properties of various factors, particularly subject variables, 
upon incidental learning. Amster (1966) concluded that 
6. 
older children perform better than younger children and that 
irrelevant cues inhibit learning. Contrary to past experiment-
ation, Greenwald and Sakumura (1967) disclosed that an 
individual's attitude does not affect the learning of propagand-
istic information in an incidental nor an intentional learning 
situation. Cohen (1966) noted that incidental learning was 
related to sex difference and to certain personality traits; 
while Paradowski (1967) established that curiosity significantly 
increased both types of learning. 
Plenderleith and Postman (1956) indicated that (1) the 
ability of the individual to attend to multiple phases of the 
information input and (2) the availability of differential 
responses to presented stimuli possess a direct relationship to 
success in incidental learning. Wide intersubject variations in 
this learning condition exist since several individuals fail 
to employ their differentiating and integrating abilities upon 
input material. Hence only readily available differential 
responses are often emitted (McLaughlin, 1965) with personal 
response habits mainly designating the pattern of selectivity 
(Postman, Adams, & Phillips, 1955). Mechanic (1962) and 
Laughlin (1967) revealed no significant relationship between 
intelligence and amount of incidental learning. Silverman and 
Blitz (1956) confirmed the postulation that increased.motivation 
decreases incidental learning with Easterbrook (1959) explaining 
these·results on the basis of restricted cue utilization. 
Finally, Laughlin (1967) indicated that creativity and 
incidental learning involve the identical process consisting 
of the formation, retention, and utilization of remote 
associations. Laughlin, Doherty, and Dunn (1968) replicated 
these findings with the additional discovery that both types 
of learning increased as a function of intelligence with high 
school students as subjects. Consequently, the pur~ose of the 
present report was to analyze the role of intelligence and 
other subject and task characteristics in intentional and 
incidental learning. Specifically, the effects of the cognitive 
structure of the individual and his level of authoritarianism 
with varying amounts of input load upon an intentional and 
incidental concept formation task were examined. 
According to the theoretical exposition posited by 
Schroder, Driver, and Streufert (1967), individuals process 
information through divergent systems under different situations 
and each person employs individualistic processing approaches 
under identical conditions. These differences exist since each 
person possesses a different conceptual structure, a system 
of mediating links denoting the method employed in the acquisi-
tion, storage, processing, and transmission of information. 
These authors are not interested in the content of material, but 
with the organization of input data. Consequently, the 
integrative complexity of the conceptual structure refers to the 
number of unique dimensions along ,which input information is 
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differentiated and the number and interrelatedness of combina-
tory schemata employed in the organization of environmental and 
self-generated information. 
Individuals maintaining a low integrative index employ 
few dimensions of information and demonstrate a relatively 
static hierarchical form of integration among few or fixed 
schemata or rules. In addition, a concrete structure demands 
comparative certainty, possesses a determinate character, and 
eliminates conflicts of choice. All rules of integration are 
subject to precise designations and all elements of ambiguity 
are immediately eliminated. Low conceptual-level individuals 
are less adaptable to environmental needs and exhibit the 
tendency to refer a stimulus to the same category once a 
decision has been formulated (Schroder et al., 196?). These 
persons also demonstrate low comprehension capabilities (Brown, 
1965), an omission of information for less critical elements 
of the environment (Suedfeld & Streufert, 1966), and a lack of 
search for novel information (Suedfeld & Streufert, 1966) or 
for information in general with imposed explicit costs (Stager 
& Kennedy, 1965). Lastly, low conceptual level members 
manifest less activity in their "searching beh~vior" (Karlins 
& Lamm, 1967) and a tendency to simplify and structure their 
environment (Stager, 196?). 
In contrast, highly complex individuals effectively adapt 
to complex, variable environments; delineate between several 
systematically related alternatives; and develop through 
current conditions superordinate schemata for information 
organization {Schrode2· & Harvey, 1963) • Comprehension and the 
ability to cope with diversity and conflict is high together 
with the desire for assimilating additional information 
{Schroder et al., 1967). Tolerance for ambiguity and uncer-
tainty with minimum attempts at reduction {Sieber & Lanzetta, 
1964) and extensive evaluation and integration of discrepant 
information characterize abstract individuals. In the same 
realm, high conceptual structures permit multiple discrimina-
tions of input along several dimensions and. the incorporation 
of various perspectives when processing discrepant units of 
inforro~tion {Karlins & Lamm, 196?). 
Research has demonstrated that conceptually complex 
subjects are more information oriented; and therefore, process 
more information in any situation {Schroder, Driver, & 
Streufert, 1965). Streufert and Schroder {1965) substantiated 
Schroder and his associates' postulated inverted U curve for the 
handling of information {Schroder et al., 1967) with additional 
clarification by Streufert and Driver {1965) and Streufert and 
Schroder (1965) that different cognitive structures display 
varying levels of this basic function, Streufert, Suedfeld, 
and Driver (1965) showed that increased information loads did 
not significantly affect searching behavior; and Suedfeld and 
Hagen (1966) found. that highly integrative individuals process 
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complex information more effectively than low-level individuals. 
Employing these concepts, our initial predictions were that 
conceptually complex subjects would perform better on the 
incidental concept formation task than low-complex subjects; 
and that since both levels of complexity display similar 
abilities in processing relevant cues, no significant differ-
ences should occur in the amount of intentional learning. 
Ignoring the environmental properties of information 
diversity and rate of information change, experimentation has 
demonstrated that degree of information load rates as a prime 
factor in the prediction of task performance. This is 
exemplified by the fact that overly simple levels of input fail 
to present sufficient units of information for integration, 
while excessive loads inhibit such activity. In the area of 
concept identification, Denny and Gamlin (1965) disclosed that 
concept-formation proficiency is highly dependent upon input 
factors while other researchers (Garner, 1962) have indicated 
that the form and the amount of redundant information signif-
icantly affect an individual's level of performance. 
The prominence of stimulus redundancy was originally 
established in the area of communication by Newman and Gerstman 
(1952) and Chapanis (1954). Research by Rappaport (1957) 
illustrated that relevant stimulus redundancy even facilitated 
the discrimination of visual forms with simultaneous background 
noise; and Bourne and Haygood (1961) discoverAd the same effect 
11 • 
. 'ant redundancy in a concept-formation task eliminating 
--:ents of irrelevant information. This conclusion under-
'~onsion when Haygood and Bourne (1964) replicated these 
1.n the presence of irrelevant information; and further 
:~d that increasing amounts of irrelevant information 
; degraded performance. 
~.s latter hypothesis has received several confirmations 
, Bourne, & Brown, 1955; Bourne, 1957; Bourne & Pendleton, 
,)ele & Archer, 1967) and fUrther clarifications • 
. lla and Archer {1962) noted that problem difficulty 
· xl linearly as irrelevant dimensions increased and there-
~ t the quantity of errors and time to achieve criterion 
imilarily increase {Rasmussen & Archer, 1961). Byers 
tdson (1968) stated that the addition of irrelevant in-
on increased complexity but produced only nonsign1f1cant 
'.~nee decrements. Trabasso (1963) predicted that removal 
~1evant cues would assist learning and Wolfgang {1967) 
0d the assumption that learning rate decreases with 
0d quantities of irrelevant input except when partners 
·mi tted free interaction. Kirloskar and Parameswaran 
indicated that irrelevant factors may have differential 
: on concept formation; and Haygood and Stevenson (1967) 
·rated that the usual rate of linear decrement is greater 
; complexity increases. Finally, Simon and Jackson {1968) 
1ed the o'bservation response with an obser-v-ation stimulus 
and found that the relevant observation stimulus aided per-
formance, while irrelevant material retarded learning. 
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Bourne and Haygood (1959) explained these findings by 
noting that learning rate depends on the quantity of both 
relevant and irrelevant information. Redundant relevant 
material assists concept identification by providing the in-
dividual access to an increased supply of cues to identify 
stimuli correctly. In contrast, redundant irrelevant infor-
mation increases the saliency of irrelevant cues and conse-
quently retards individual attainments. Walker and Bourne 
(1961) clarified the two uses of the concept "redundancy" by 
emphasizing that one demands that the subject employ additional 
information in the classification of material, while the other 
permits the participant to use any one of several relevant 
dimensions to categorize stimuli. 
By incorporating this latter usage with the comment by 
Winnick and Wasserman (1959) that variation in irrelevant 
material affects incidental learning and through extension of 
conclusions concerning stimulus dimensions to the actual amount 
of exemplars of a concept, the predictions for this report were 
formulatede Since instructions focused the subject's attention 
on the intentional task, examples of this concept were con-
sidered as relevant information and all other st:1.muli as irrele-
vant material. Consequently, the hypothesis was that as the 
list of relevcnt intenti0nal nouns increased, performance would 
1.3. 
increase. In contrast, the prediction for incidental learning 
was a linear decrement in performance for the same lists since 
in the incidental concept-formation task, all intentional 
concept words would be processed as irrelevant information. 
Regarding the third variable, authoritarianism has been 
explained in terms of cognitive style. Adorno and his asso-
ciates (1950) postulated that high authoritarianism may be 
characterized by rigidity in thinking. This suggests that 
representative individuals will function less effectively when 
certain cognitive shifts are required, when novel cognitive 
material is displayed, and when ambiguity exists in the task 
situation (Brown, 1965). In the initial position, Rokeach 
(1948) found a positive relationship between authoritarianism 
and inability to shift from an established "set" in solving 
a numerical problem. Brown (195.3) managed to repeat these 
results for ego-involved subjects; and Jackson, Messick, and 
Solley (1957) discovered an identical association; however, they 
explained their results as reflecting acquiescence both in the 
F scores and the measures of rigidity. 
Research analyzing the relationship between authoritar-
ianism and tolerance of ambiguity has not been conclusive 
(Davids, 1956; Kenny and Ginsberg, 1958); however, Milton's 
(1957) experiment clearly differentiated between the two 
entities of "intolerance of ambiguity" and "rigidity" in a 
novel ·perceptual task. White and Harvey ( 1965) at tempted to 
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demonstrate that individuals scoring high on the F Scale are 
generally more concrete; and consequently, less tolerant of un-
certainty and ambiguity. Harvey (196J) summarized his research 
on authoritarianism (Harvey & Rutherford, 1958; Harvey & 
Beverly, 1961; Harvey, 1962) and generally concluded that high 
authoritative people form concepts of novel stimuli more quickly 
in comparison to low authoritative persons, that "highs" ward 
off changes in their fo~mulated concepts, and demonstrate less 
discrimination on concepts of central significance to the 
individual. 
In recent experimentation, several investigators have noted 
that generally individuals scoring high on the California F 
Scale demonstrate characteristics of a simple cognitive 
structure. Likewise, subjects rating low on the Authoritar-
ianism Scale display rather complex information-processing 
behavior. However, as indicated by Schroder and his associates 
(1967), this relationship has not been conclusively explicated; 
and therefore, one of the goals of this project was to reanalyze 
the correspondence between these two entities. Similarly, the 
hypothesis was that low authoritative individuals would perform 
better on the incidental-learning task than persons ranlcing high 
on the Authoritarianism Scale and that no differences would 
occur on the intentional concept-formation task. 
Finally, the investigators predicted that performance on 
incidental co!lcept formacion would not be-related to degrees 
15. 
of intelligence but that differences would be significant with 
analysis of covariance employing level of cognitive complexity 
as the covariate. No interactions between authoritarianism and 
information load were hypothesized. However, predictions for 
an interaction between degree of cognitive structure and 
information input were formulated. 
Method 
Subjects. The subjects were 144 female seniors from 
Aquinas High School, a non-coeducational institution. Three 
groups of 48 participants were randomly composed and were 
randomly assigned to one of three experimental treatments. 
Regular homeroom teachers administered the California F Scale 
and Schroder's Paragraph Completion Test in one session to 
eliminate testing bias; and the experimenter, introduced 
simply as from Loyola University, administered the concept-
formation task on a different day in the same homeroom. 
Subjects were not aware that the two sessions were related, 
~· The stimuli employed in the intentional and in-
cidental concept-learning tasks were adopted from Underwood 
and Richardson's (1956) article. These authors attempted to 
develop standardized test materials for incorporation in verbal 
concept-formation studies by determining the frequency of 
response tendencies to common verbal stimuli. All stimuli were 
16. 
nouns; and all responses were restricted to sense impressions 
only, for example, cold, small, or sharp. The percentage of 
college participants replying with a particular one-word 
association to a singly-presented stimulus was considered an 
index of the associative strength of the response to the stim-
ulus noun. 
For the first level of input complexity, the task materials 
were identical to those employed by Laughlin (1967). Ten sets 
of six nouns each were composed with four words in each set 
exemplifying the same concept, designated for the intentional 
concept-formation task. This meant that all four words emitted 
the same associative response in a high percentage of subjects 
in the Underwood and Richardson study. For example, subjects 
responded with the term sharE when presented with the four words 
knife, hatchet, fang, and tack. Thus these nouns were con-
sidered exemplars of the concept sharp. The other two words in 
each set also represented a concept. This concept was totally 
unrelated to the first one and was designated for the inci-
dental concept-formation task. 
For the second level of information input (eight words per 
list} and for the third level of input complexity (ten words 
per list), additional intentional concept words, acquired from 
Underwood and Richardson, were randomly inserted into the basic 
list of six nouns used for the first level. All tasl{ words 
were randomly arranged within each set; and all ten sets were 
17. 
randomly arranged for each trial. Sequences, however, remained 
constant over the various levels of information; and all 
incidental concept words were identical for all three con-
ditions. The ten sets of six, eight, and ten stimulus words 
(four, six, or eight for the intentional concept-formation 
task and the two words for the incidental concept-formation 
task) are presented in table 1. 
18. 
Table 1 
Stimulus Words for Intentional and Incidental 
Concept-Learning Tasks 
Set Intentional Incidental Set Intentional Incidental 
Concept Concept Concept Conce;et 
1 (Smelly) (Cold) 6 (Round) (Sour) 
First Level First Level 
ammonia(88T frost(54) globe(95) vinegar(68) 
manure(BJ) icicle(45) wheel(94) sauerkraut(41) 
garbage ( 80) spool(74) 
skunk(78) baseball(70) 
Second Level Second Level 
formaldehyde(81) barrel ( '72 ) 
sewer(61) button(61) 
Third Level Third Level 
ether(70) dome ( 70) 
turpentine(67) balloon(55) 
2 (Green) (Spicy) 7 (Dark) (Slimy). 
First Level First Level 
spinach(90) ginger(40) night(90) eel(68) 
grass(88) clove(J2) dungeon(67) lizard(51) 
ivy(8J) closet(64) 
lawn(77) tunnel ( 54·) 
Second Level Second Level 
moss(52r-- cave(66) 
pine tree(25) alley(49) 
Third Level Third Level 
grasshopper(55) hallway(l6l 
seaweed(49) forest(l4) 
3 (Red) (Hard) 8 (Sharp) (Black) 
First Level First Level 
blush(96) stone(63) knife(84) coal (85) 
beet(87) knuckle(62) hatchet(??) telephone(65) 
cherry(77) fang(75) 
e..pple(67) tack( 6L1-) 
19. 
Second Level Second Level 
blood{91) fishhook(70) 
tomato( SJ) spear(68) 
Third Level Third Level 
cranberry(69) pin{55} 
lips(59) dagger(70) 
4 (Small) (Yellow) 9 (White) (Soft) 
First Level First Level 
atom(s7i-- canary(82) milk(8J) p1llow(87) 
flea(86) dandelion(85) teeth(72) velvet(67) 
germ(84) snow(?l) 
gnat(76) 1vory(65) 
Second Level Second Level 
crumb{79) 'Cha1iCTsor--
minnow(62) napkin(62) 
Third Level 'I'hird Level 
village(74) cauliflo'Wer( 64) 
mouse(54) pearl(J?) 
5 (Shiny) (Bro1'm) 10 (Large) (Sweet) 
First Level First Level 
jewel(67) tobacco(8J) ocean(JJ) sugar(82) 
diamond(65) chocolate(61) mansion( SJ) honey(49) 
aluminum(59) elephant(8J) 
badge(J2) auditorium(84) 
Second Level Second Level 
rhinestone(67) stadiumT?ST" 
buckle(J2) city(?2) 
Third Level Third Level 
ariiiOr c 2 s > whale( 77) 
bracelet(25) boulder(46) 
Note.- Numbers in parentheses represent the percentage of 
subjects classifying each stimulus word in the designated 
category (Underwood & Richardson, 1956). 
20. 
Procedure and instructions. Subjects were initially 
administered the California F Scale (Adorno et al., 1950) and 
Schroder's Paragraph Completion Test (Schroder and Streufert, 
196J) in groups ranging from JO to 45 students. The instruc-
tions for the cognitive complexity test were: 
Below are listed six sentence stems. Your task 
is to write two or three sentences in response 
to each stem. You will have approximately li 
minutes to write on each stem. (Actually sub-
jects received 120 seconds for each stem.) 
Please work rapidly. 
After completion of this task, subjects were given ten minutes 
to finish the authoritarianism test. The instructions at the 
beginning of the questionnaire were: 
Here are some statements with which many people 
agree and many other people disagree. Will you 
show how much you agree or disagree with each 
statement by placing a number in front of each 
statement. The numbers mean the following: 
+3 strong support, agreement 
+2 moderate support, agreement 
+l slight support, a.greement 
-1 slight opposition, disagreement 
-2 moderate opposition, disa.greement 
-J strong opposition, disagreement 
Be sure to use a plus or minus sign in front 
of your number to show whether you are agree-
ing or disagreeing with the statement. The 
number itself will show how strongly you ag-
ree or disagree. Work fast-----just give 
your first reaction. 
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Upon completion, the test booklets were collected and students 
were permitted to resume their normal activity. 
One to two weeks later the concept-formation task was 
administered to three groups of 48 students. Each subject 
received a test booklet and instructions to learn only the in-
tentional concept. However, since all stimuli were presented 
verbally, the incidental and the intentional concept words were 
delivered together. Specifically, the instructions on the 
booklet were: 
Six (eight, ten) words will be pronounced 
aloud. Four (six, eight) of these six 
(eight, ten) words will go together in some 
way. These four (six, eight) words exem-
plify a concept. Listen carefully to all 
six (eight, ten) words, and then fig~re 
out the concept or the way in which four 
(six, eight) of the six (eight, ten) words 
are related. ~hen write the concept word 
in the blank. For example, consider the 
following six (eight, ten) words: "math-
ematics, physics, house, sociology, history, 
gymnasium" (philosophy, chemistry; english, 
religion). The four (six, eight) words that 
go together in some way are ''mathematics", 
"physics", ''sociology", and "history" 
("philosophy", "chemistry"; "english", 
"religion") because they are all "subjects". 
Thus, the concept is "subjects", and you 
would write "subjects" in the blank provided. 
Do not turn each page until you are instructed 
to do so. 
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Subjects were asked to read the instructions while the ex-
perimenter delivered them verbally. All instructions were 
identical for the three experimental groups except for the 
indicated adjustments necessitated by the variation in the 
amount of presented stimuli. 
All ten sets of task words were read four times to each 
group in a steady monotone with ten seconds between each set 
and approximately fifteen seconds between each trial. Each 
subject was required to write her responses for all sets of one 
trial on a separate page. After the last trial, the directions 
on the last page were: 
Now, the four (six, eight) words that ex-
emplified each concept are given below. 
--~--.. ---~-~------------------~--~· wwww.www 
For each of the four (six, eight) words 
try to recall the other two words that 
were not pa.rt of the concept. These two 
words, however, were also like each other 
in some way, and thus exemplified another 
concept. Write the two other words and 
the concept they exemplified below in 
the blanks provided. 
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A new random order of concept words and sets was employed in 
the incidental concept-formation task. Subjects were allowed 
eight minutes to complete this task; after which, the booklets 
were collected and students requested to remain silent regard-
ing the details of the experiment. Intelligence scores on the 
SRA High School Placement Test were acquired from school files. 
Results 
Within each of the three information levels (six, eight, 
or ten stimulus words), the 48 subjects were initially rank-
ordered on conceptual complexity and subsequently divided into 
high, medium, a:nd low thirds. This resulted in a J x J facto-
rial design with the variables being: (a) information input 
(six, eight, or ten) and (b) cognitive complexity (high, medium, 
or low). Means for the high, medium, and low cognitive groups 
were 5.48, 4.17, and 2.98, respectively. In addition, sub-
jects within each level were ranked on authoritarianism and 
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divided into thirds. This resulted in another 3 x 3 factorial 
design with the variables: (a) information level (first, 
second, or third), and (b) authoritarianism (high, medium, or 
low). Means for the three authoritative groups were 113.58 
(high), 93.58 (medium), and 68.44 (low). Finally, the same 
subjects were rank-ordered on intelligence and a comparable 
procedure used to acquire the high, medium, and low levels. 
The means for these three groups were 125.08, 114.31, and 
103.29, respectively. This permitted a 3 x 3 factorial analysis 
with variables: (a) information, and (b) intelligence (high, 
medium, or low). 
The three dependent variables were the number of correct 
intentional and incidental concepts formed and the number of 
incidental concept words recalled. Statistical analysis on 
each set of data included: (a) two-way analysis of variance for 
information and cognitive complexity, (b) analysis of covariance 
for information and cognitive complexity with intelligence as 
covariate, (c) two-way analysis of variance for information and 
authoritarianism, (d) two analyses of covariance for author-
itarianism and information with intelligence as covariate in one 
case and cognitive complexity as covariate in the other, (e) 
two-way analysis of variance for information and intelligence, 
and (f) analysis of covariance for information and intelligence 
with cognitive complexity as covariate. 
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Intentional Concent Formation 
The mean number of correct intentional concepts for groups 
differentiated on cognitive complexity, authoritarianism, 
information input, and intelligence are presented in Table 2. 
Summary tables for analyses of variance and covariance for 
groups divided on cognitive complexity are given in Table J. 
A summary of the analysis of variance for groups differing on 
authoritarianism is presented in Table 4 with the summary tables 
for the analyses of covariance for groups differentiated on 
authoritarianism located in Table 5. Table 6 presents the 
summary tables for analyses of variance and covariance for 
the high, medium, and low intelligence groups. 
Means for intentional concept formation for the high, 
medium, and low cognitive complexity groups were J2.04, J0.33, 
and 29.38 with the overall analyses of variance and covariance 
resulting in nonsignificant differences. In contrast, the means 
for the first, second, and third level of information were 
27079, 32.98, and 30.98. Analysis of variance revealed a 
significant effect for input load at the oOOl level, F (2, 135) = 
8.09. The linear component of the overall trend was significant 
at the .025 level, F (1, 135) = 5.95, as was the quadratic 
component, F (1, 135) = 10.08, .E <.005. However, it was noted 
that the linear component accounted for only 37% of the variance 
while the quadratic component accounted for 63% of the differ-
ence. · These differences remained signific~nt at the .001 level 
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with analysis of covariance employing intelligence as the 
covariate, F (2, 134) = 8.46. The adjusted means for the 
three groups were 27.83, 32.91, and J0.91. Duncan's multiple-
range test showed that the second level differed significantly 
from the first level (E <.001), and th~t the third level 
scored higher than the first level (£ <.05). The second level 
did not differ significantly from the third level. 
Means for the high, medium, and low authoritative groups 
were J2.8J, 29.77, and 29.15. Overall analysis of variance 
was not significant nor were the analyses of covariance using 
intelligence and cognitive complexity as the covariates. 
Results for information on the analyses of variance and 
covariance (covariate: intelligence) were identical to those 
discussed above. On the analysis of covariance using cognitive 
complexity as covariate, information input had a significant 
effect at the .001 level, F (2, 134) = 8011. The adjusted 
means for the three levels were 27.82, 33.02, and 30.90. 
Duncan multiple-range test indicated: (a) the second level 
differed from the first level(£ <.001), (b) the third level 
differed from the first level (£ <.05), and (c) no difference 
between the second and third levels. 
Finally, the means for the high, medium, and low intelli-
gence groups were 32.83, 29.77, and 29.15. Overall analysis 
of varle.nce resulted in a significant difference at the .Ol 
level; F (2, 135) = 4.92. The differences remained significant 
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with analysis of covariance (covariates cognitive complexity), 
F (2, 1J4) = 4.69, £ <.01. A comparison of the adjusted means 
showed that the high intelligence group (M = )2.78) differed 
significantly from the low group (M = 29.19) at the .01 level; 
that the medium intelligence group (~ = 29.77) differed from 
the high group(£ <.05); and that there was no difference 
between the low and medium groups. 
In summary, the effect of information input remained 
significant on all analyses, while cognitive complexity and 
authoritarianism had no effect on results. Groups differ-
entiated on intelligence differed significantly and this 
difference remained with cognitive complexity as a covariate. 
Further, none of the interactions on intentional concepts were 
significant. 
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Table 2 
Mean Intentional Concept Formation for Groups Differentiated 
on Cognitive Complexity, Authoritarianism, and 
Cognitive 
Level Mean 
Intelligence with Varying Amounts 
of Information Input 
Complexity Information Input 
Adjusted M Level Mean Adjusted M Adjusted 
(IQ as (IQ as - (CC as 
M 
covariate) covariate) covariate) 
High 32.04 31.75 First 27.79 27.83 27.82 
Medium 30.33 29.98 Second 32.98 32 .91 33.02 
Low 29.38 30.02 Third 30.98 30.91 30.90 
Intelligence Authoritarianism 
Level Mean Adjusted N Level Mean Adjusted M Adjusted M 
(CC as (IQ as - (CC as 
covariate) covariate) covariate) 
High 32.83 32.78 High 29.94 30.52 30.04 
Medium 29.77 29.77 Medium 30.12 30.03 30.19 
Low 29.15 29.19 Low 31.69 31.20 31.52 
Note.-I1aximum intentional concept formation is 40.00. 
The following abbreviations are used: IQ = intelligence; CC = 
cognitive complexity. 
Table 3 
Analyses of Variance and Covariance for Intentional 
Concept Formation for Groups Differentiated 
on Conceptual Complexity with Three 
Levels of Information 
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Covariance 
Source df SS MS F df SS .MS F 
- - - - - - - -
Information( I: 2 657.13 328.56 8.09* 2 632.83 316.42 8.46* 
Conceptual 
Complexity(C) 2 175.17 87.58 2.16 2 98.62 49.31 1.32 
I x C 4 118.83 29.71 .73 4 111.31 27.83 .74 
Error (wg) 135 5483.88 40.62 . 134 5009. 50 37.38 
Total 143 6435.01 142 5852.26 
*.E <.001. 
Table 4 
Analysis of Variance for Intentional Concept Formation 
for Groups Differentiated on Authoritarianism 
with Three Levels of Information Input 
Source df SS MS F 
Information Input (I) 2 657.12 328.56 8.16* 
Authoritarianism (A) 2 88.62 44.31 1.10 
A x I 4 252.51 63.13 1.57 
Error {wg) 135 5436.75 40.27 
Total 143 6435.00 
*.E <.001. 
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Table 5 
Analyses of Covariance for Intentional Concept Formation 
for Groups Differentiated on Authoritarianism 
with Varying Amounts of Information 
Covariate: Covariate: 
Intelligence Cognitive Complexity 
-
Source df SS MS F df SS MS F 
- - - - - - -
Information 
(I) 2 633.72 316.86 8.48* 2 654.70 327.35 8.11* 
Author. (A)a 2 32 .26 16.13 .43 2 65.77 
A x I 4 179.19 44.79 1.20 4 259.78 
Error (wg) 134 5009.64 37.38 134 5410.72 
Total 142 5854.81 142 6390.97 
-
aAbbreviated form for authoritarianism. 
*.E <.001. 
J2.88 .81 
64.95 1.61 
40.J8 
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Table 6 
Analyses of Variance and Covariance for Intentional 
Concept Formation for Groups Differentiated 
on Intelligence with Three Levels 
of Information Input 
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Covariance 
Source df SS MS F 
- - - -
Information 
Input {A) 2 657.12 .328.56 8.64** 
Intelligence 
(B) 2 373.88 
A x B 4 269,38 
Error (wg) 135 5134.62 
Total ~4.3 6435.00 
*E <.01. 
**..E <.001. 
186.94 4.92* 
67.34 1.77 
38. 0 .3 
df SS MS F 
- - - -
2 655.08 327.54 8. ss~-* 
2 .358.54 179.27 4.69* 
4 264.81 66.20 1.73 
1.34 5117.17 .38.19 
142 6395.60 
33. 
Incidenta~ Concept Formation 
The means on 1nc1dental concept formation for groups 
differentiated on cognitive complexity, authoritarianism, in-
telligence, and information are presented in Table 7. Summary 
tables for analyses of variance and covariance for groups 
distinguished on cognitive complexity are given in Table 9. 
Table 10 contains the summary table for analysis of variance for 
high, medium, and low authoritarianism groups with summary 
tables for analyses of covariance for these same groups located 
in Table 11. A summary of the analyses of variance and co-
variance for groups differing on intelligence are presented in 
Table 12. 
Means for the high, medium, and low cognitive groups on the 
number of correct incidental concepts formed were 1.92, 1.96, 
and l.OL~, respectively. Analysis of variance revealed that 
the effect of cognitive complexity was significant at the .05 
level. However, this difference did not remain significant with 
analysis of covariance employing intelligence as the covariate. 
For information input, the first level had a mean of 2.38, the 
second level 1.44, and the third level 1.10. Overall analysis 
of variance resulted in a significant difference at the .005 
level, F (2, 135) = 5.80 which remained significant with 
analysis of covariance, F (2, 134) = 6.84, E <.005 •. The 
adjusted means for these three groups were: high = 2.39, 
medium = 1.41, and low = loll. Tbe results of Duncan multiple-
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range comparisons demonstrated that the first level differed 
significantly from the third level (£ <.001), that the first 
level scored higher than the second level at the .Ol level, and 
that there was no difference between the second and third 
levels. 
Means for the high, medium and low authoritarianism groups 
were 1.25, 1.35, and 2.31. Analysis of variance showed that 
the effect of authoritarianism was significant at the .01 level, 
F (2, 135) = 4.72. These differences remained significant with 
analysis of covariance (covariate: intelligence), F (2, 134) = 
2.79, E. ~.06; and analysis of covariance with cognitive complex-
ity as the covariate, F (2, 134) = 4.16, E <.025. In the first 
instance, the adjusted means for the three authoritative groups 
were 1.48, l.Jl, and 2.12. Comparisons indicated that there 
were no differences between the medium and high authoritative 
groups nor between the low and high groups but that the low 
group differed significantly from the medium group at the .05 
level. The adjusted means for the high, medium, and low 
authoritarianism groups when cognitive complexity was used as 
covariate were 1.28, 1.37, and 2.26, respectively. Duncan's 
multiple-range test revealed that the low group differed from 
both the high and the medium groups at the .05 level and that 
there was no difference between the medium and high groups. 
Results for information input on the analyses of variance 
and covariance with intelligence as covariate were basically 
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identical to those discussed above. On analysis of covariance 
employing cognitive complexity as covariate, the effect of input 
was significant at the 0005 level, F (2, 134) = 6.04. The 
adjusted means for these three levels were 2.38, 1.44, and 1.09. 
Comparisons showed that the first level differed from the third 
level at the .005 level, that the difference between the first 
and second levels was significant at the .05 level, and that the 
second and third levels did not differ significantly. 
The mean for the high intelligence group was 2.56, for the 
medium group 1.56, and for the low group .79. Overall analysis 
of variance resulted in significant difference at the .001 
level, F (2, 135) = 12031. With analysis of covariance 
(covariate: cognitive complexity), the difference remained 
significant at the same level, F (2, 134) = 11,87. Duncan's 
test performed on the adjusted means indicated that the low 
intelligence group (M = .81) differed from the high group 
(M = 2.54) at the .001 level, that the high group differed from 
the medium group (M = 1.56), £ <.01, and that the medium group 
scored significantly higher than the low group at the .05 
level. Since the interaction between intelligence and in-
formation l'ras significant at the .05 level in the analysis of 
variance and covariance, Table 8 contains the individual cell 
means, Comparisons demonstrated that the first level-high 
intelligence group diff ercd significantly from all other groups 
. 
(.E, <,001) and that no other differences were significant. 
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In summary, the effect of information input upon incidental 
concept formation was significant in all analyses; while the 
difference between cognitive complexity groups was initially 
significant but did not remain with intelligence as a covariate. 
Groups differentiated on the basis of authoritarianism were 
significantly different even when intelligence and cognitive 
complexity were employed as covariates. Finally, the effect 
of intelligence was significant and this difference remained 
with cognitive complexity as a covariate. The only significant 
interaction in the entire experiment was between intelligence 
and information but this only indicated that low input and 
high intelligence affected performance. 
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Table 7 
Mean Incidental Concept Formation for Groups Differentiated 
on Cognitive Complexity, Authoritarianism, and 
Intelligence with Varying Amounts 
of Information Input 
Cognitive ComElexity Information InEut 
Level Mean Adjusted M Level Mean Adjusted M Adjusted M 
(IQ as (IQ as - (CC as 
covariate) covariate) cove.ria te) 
High 1.92 1.81 First 2.38 2.39 2.38 
Medium 1.96 1.82 Second 1.44 1.41 1.44 
Low 1.04 1.29 Third 1.10 loll 1.09 
Intelligence Authoritarianism 
Level Mean Adjusted M Level Mean Adjusted M Adjusted M 
(CC as (IQ as - (CC as 
covariate) covariate) covariate) 
High 2.56 2.54 High 1.25 1.48 1.28 
Medium 1.56 1.56 Medium 1.35 1.31 1.37 
Low .79 .81 Low 2.31 2.12 2.26 
-------
Note.-.Maximum incidental concept formation is 10.00. 
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Table 8 
Individual Cell Means from the Two-Way Analysis 
Information 
Input 
First Level 
Second Level 
Third Level 
for Incidental Concept Formation 
High 
Intelligence 
Medium Low 
Mean Adjusted M Mean Adjusted M Mean Adjusted M 
(CC as (CC as - (CC as 
4.19 
1.81 
1.69 
covariate) covariate) covariate) 
4.19 
1.81 
1.66 
2.00 
1.69 
1.00 
2.02 
1.68 
.99 
.94 
.81 
.62 
.94 
.85 
.61 
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Table 9 
Analyses of Variance and Covariance for Incidental 
Concept Formation for Groups Differentiated 
on Conceptual Complexity with Three 
Levels of Information 
Analysis 
Source df SS 
Information 
(I) 2 41.68 
Conceptual 
Complexity 
(C) 2 25.72 
I x C 4 10.69 
Error (wg) 135 485.12 
Total 143 563.22 
*.E <.05. 
**.E <.005. 
of Variance Analysis 
MS F df SS 
20.84 5.80** 2 42.77 
12.86 J.58* 2 9.12 
2.67 .74 ·4 5.63 
3.59 1J4 418.67 
142 476.19 
of Covariance 
MS F 
21.38 6.84** 
4.56 1.46 
1.41 .45 
3.12 
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Table 10 
Analysis of Variance for Incidental Concept Formation 
for Groups Differentiated on Authoritarianism 
with Varying Levels of Information 
Source 
Information (I) 
Authoritarianism 
A x I 
Error {wg) 
Total 
*.E <.01. 
**E <.005. 
(A) 
df SS MS 
2 41.68 20.84 
2 J2.9J 16.46 
4 16.99 4.25 
135 471.62 3.49 
14J 563.22 
F 
5°97** 
4.72* 
1.22 
Table 11 
Analyses of Covariance for Incidental Concept Formation for 
Groups Differentiated on Authoritarianism with 
Three Levels of Information Input 
Covariate: Covariate: 
Intelligence Cognitive Complexity 
Source df SS MS F df SS MS F 
-
Information 
41. 
(I) 2 
Author. (A)a 2 
A x I 4 
42.74 21.37 7.0l**** 
17.03 8.52 2. 79·:1-
7.29 1.82 .60 
2 42.44 21.22 6.04*** 
2 29.26 14.63 4.16** 
4 17.34 4.34 1.23 
Error (wg) 
Total 
134 409.35 
142 476.41 
3.05 134 470.77 3.51 
142 559.81 
aAbbreviated form for authoritarianism. 
*E ~.06. 
**E <.025. 
*i:·*E <.005. 
****E <.001. 
Table 12 
Analyses of Variance and Covariance for Incidental 
Concept Formation for Groups Differentiated 
on Intelligence with Varying Levels 
of Information Input 
42. 
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Covariance 
Source 
Information 
Input (A) 
Intelligence 
{B) 
Ax B 
Error (wg) 
Total 
*E <.05. 
**E <.005. 
***E <.001. 
df SS MS 
2 41.68 20.84 
2 75.68 37.84 
4 30.99 7.75 
135 414.88 3.07 
143 563.22 
F df SS MS F 
6.78** 2 42.84 21.42 6.95*** 
12.31*** 2 73.23 36.62 11.87*** 
2.52* 4 31.23 7.81 2.53* 
134 413.27 J.08 
142 560.57 
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Incidental £oncept Words 
The mean number of incidental concept words recalled by 
groups differentiated on cognitive complexity, authoritarianism, 
j_nformation, and intelligence are given in Table 1.3. Table 
14 contains the summary tables for the analyses of variance and 
covariance performed on various cognitive groups, A summary 
of the analysis of variance for groups differing on author-
itarianism is given in Table 15; while Table 16 presents the 
summary tables for the analyses of covariance for these groups. 
Lastly, summary tables for analyses of variance and covariance 
for groups distinguished on the basis of intelligence are 
located in Table 17. 
The means for the high, medium and low cognitive groups 
were 5.23, 5.27, and ).52, respectively. Analysis of variance 
demonstrated that cognitive structure had a significant effect 
at the .025 level, F (2, 135) = 3.95. However, this signif-
icance was lost with analysis of covariance employing 
intelligence as a covariate. In contrast, the effect of in-
formation was significant at the .005 level with analysis of 
variance, F (2, 135) = 6.44, and at the .001 level with analysis 
of covariance {covariate: intelligence), F (2, 1J4) = 7.12. 
The means for the three levels of input were 6,00, 4.56, and 
3.46; and the adjusted means were 6.02 (first), 4.52 (second), 
and 3.47 (third). Multiple comparisons revealed that there 
was no differ~nce between the sec9nd and third levels, but that 
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the difference between the first and the third levels was 
significant (E <.001), and between the first and second levels 
at the .05 level. 
The mean for the high authoritarianism group was 3.96, for 
the medium group 4.06, and for the low level 6.oo. Overall 
analysis of variance was significant (F (2, 135) = 5.36, 
E <.005) as were the analyses of covariance with intelligence 
as covariate (F (2, 134) = 3.57, E <.05) and with cognitive 
complexity as covariate (F (2, 134) = 4.76, £ <.01). The 
adjusted means in the first instance (intelligence as covariate) 
were 4.JO, 4.01, and 5.71 for the three groups. Duncan's 
multiple-range test showed that the low group differed signif-
icantly from both the high and the medium groups at the .05 
level and that there was no difference between the medium and 
the high group. With cognitive complexity as covariate, the 
adjusted means were 4.02, 4.10, and 5.90. The resultant 
comparisons were similar to those for intelligence as covariate. 
Results for information input on the analyses of variance 
and covariance (covariate: intelligence) were identical to 
those discussed previously. On analysis of covariance with 
cognitive complexity as the covariate, the effect of input was 
significant at the .005 level, F (2, 134) = 6.66. The adjusted 
means for the three levels weres first = 6.0l, second = 4.57, 
and third = 3.44. Comparisons indicated that the first level 
differed from the third level at the .001-lev~l, that th~ first 
level performed better than the second level (I?. <,05), and 
that there was no difference between the second and third 
levels. 
For groups differentiated on the basis of intelligence, 
the high group had a mean of 5,98, the medium 4.69, and the low 
3.35, Overall analysis of variance resulted in a significant 
difference at the ,001 level, F (2, 135) = 7,42, This 
significant difference was maintained with analysis of 
covariance employing cognitive complexity as the covariate, 
F (2, 134) = 7,10, .E <,001. Duncan multiple-range comparisons 
on adjusted means revealed that the high group (M = 5.95) 
differed significantly from the low group (M = 3,38) at the 
,001 level, and that the medium group (M = 4.69) differed from 
neither the low nor the high group. 
In summary, the effect of information was significant in 
all analyses, while all interactions involving recalled in-
cidental words were nonsignificant. Groups differentiated on 
cognitive complexity were initially significant; however, this 
difference did not remain with intelligence as a covariate. 
High, medium, and low authoritative groups differed signif-
icantly even when intelligence and cognitive complexity were 
employed as covariates, Finally, the effect of intelligence 
was significant and this difference was maintained with 
cognitive complexity as a covariate, 
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Table 1.3 
Mean Quantity of Incidental Concept Words Recalled for 
Groups Differentiated on Cognitive Complexity, 
Authoritarianism, and Intelligence with 
Varying Levels of Information Input 
Cognitive Complexity Information Input 
Level Mean Adjusted M Level Nean Adjusted M Adjusted (IQ as - (IQ as - (CC as M 
covariate) covariate) covariate) 
High 5.23 5.05 First 6.oo 6.02 6.01 
Medium 5.27 5.06 Second 4.56 4.52 4.57 
Low J.52 J.91 Third J.46 3.47 J.44 
Intelligence Authoritarianism 
Level Mean Adjusted M Level Mean Adjusted M Adjusted M (CC as (IQ as - (CC as 
covariate) covariate) covariate) 
High 5.98 5.95 High J.96 4.30 4.02 
Medium 4.69 4.69 Medium 4.06 4.01 4.10 
Low 3.35 3.38 Low 6.oo 5.71 5.90 
Note.-Naximum incidental concept words is 20.00. 
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Table 14 
Analyses of Variance and Covariance for Quantity of Incidental 
Concept Words Recalled for Groups Differentiated on 
Conceptual Complexity with Varying Amounts 
of Information 
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Covariance 
Source df SS MS F 
- - - -
Information 
(I) 2 155.93 77.96 6.44** 
Conceptual 
Complexity 2 95.72 47.86 J.95* (C) 
I x C 4 42.07 10.52 
Error (wg) 135 1633.94 
Total 143 1927.66 
*£ <.025. 
**£ <.005. 
***£ <.001. 
12.10 
.87 
df SS MS F 
- - - -
2 157.67 78.84 7.12*** 
2 44.18 22.09 1.99 
4 31.07 7.77 .70 
134 1484.)2 11.08 
142 1717.24 
Table 15 
Analysis of Variance for Quantity of Incidental Concept 
Words Recalled for Groups Differentiated on 
Authoritarianism with Three Levels 
of Information Input 
Source df SS MS E 
-
Information Input (I) 2 155.93 77.96 6.58* 
Authoritarianism (A) 2 126.93 63.46 5.36* 
A x I 4 44.99 11.25 .95 
Error (wg) 135 1599.81 11.85 
Total 143 1927. 66 
*£ <.005. 
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Table 16 
Analyses of Covariance for Quantity of Incidental Concept 
Words Recalled for Groups Differentiated on 
Authoritarianism with Three Levels 
Source 
Information 
(I) 
a Author. (A) 
A x I 
Error (wg) 
Total 
of Information 
Covariate a 
Intelligence 
df SS MS F 
2 157.66 78.83 7.25**** 
2 77.57 J8.78 J.57* 
4 26.00 6.50 .60 
134 1456.51 10.87 
142 1717.74 
Covariate: 
Cognitive Complexity 
df SS MS F 
-
2 158.72 79,36 6.66*** 
2 113,35 56.68 4.76** 
4 46.J4 11.59 .97 
134 1596.93 11.92 
142 1915.34 
aAbbreviated form for authoritarianism, 
*E <,05, 
**E <,01. 
***£ <.005. 
****E <,001. 
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Table 17 
Analyses of Variance and Covariance for Quantity of Incidental 
Concept Words Recalled for Groups Differentiated 
on Intelligence with Varying Amounts 
of Information Input 
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Covariance 
Source df SS MS F df SS MS F 
Information 
Input (A) 2 155.93 77.96 6.99* 2 160.63 80.31 7.18* 
Intelligence 
(B) 2 165.39 82.69 7.42* 2 158.89 79.44 7.10* 
Ax B 4 101.90 25.48 2.29 4 101.37 25.34 2.27 
Error (wg) 135 1504.44 11.14 134 1498.72 11.18 
Total 143 1927.66 142 1919.61 
*£ <.001. 
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Interrelationships of Variables 
Table 18 presents the intercorrelations between the depend-
ent variables and the three personality variables involved in 
the preceding analyses for the entire group of 144 subjects. 
Cognitive complexity scores correlated .08 with intentional 
concept formation, .06 with incidental concepts formed, and 
.05 with amount of incidental words recalled. Intelligence 
scores, on the other hand, correlated .30 and .39 with in-
tentional and incidental concept formation respectively, and 
.33 with quantity of recalled words. Scores on the F Scale 
correlated -.12 with intentional concept formation, -.23 with 
incidental concept formation, and -.24 with incidental words 
recalled. Intentional and incidental concept formation 
correlated .19; and incidental concept formation correlated 
.89 with the amount of incidental words recalled. Finally, 
cognitive complexity correlated -.20 with authoritarianism and 
.11 with intelligence scores. 
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Table 18 
Intercorrelations Between the Dependent Variables 
and the Three Personality Variables 
IcW IcC IQ F cc 
Int .24 .19 .JO -.12 .08 
IcW .89 .JJ -.24 .05 
IcC .39 -.23 .06 
IQ 
-.23 .11 
F 
-.20 
Note.-Abbreviat1ons represents intentional concept forma-
tion (Int), incidental concept words (IcW), incidental concept 
formation (Ice), intelligence (IQ), author1tarian1sm (F), 
cognitive complexity (CC). 
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Discussion 
The hypothesis predicting no difference between abstract 
and concrete conceptual structures on intentional concept 
formation was substantiated. This would seem to indicate that 
both types possess similar abilities in processing relevant 
cues; and that in a situation demanding minimal integrative 
processes, simple structures function as effectively as high-
level individuals. This finding coincides with Schroder's 
(1967) contention that equality will exist between levels if 
sufficient material is delivered to the subject and if appro-
priate performance requirements are explicitly stated. 
Contrary to our prediction, high-level subjects did not 
perform significantly better than simple-level individuals on 
incidental concept formation. This result may be attributed to 
either the inappropriateness of the task environment or to the 
validity of the Paragraph Completion Test. In the first case, 
Schroder states in his book (1967) that overly simple task 
situations often fail to stimulate processes of integration, 
therefore permitting low-level structures to function effect-
ively. Streufert and Schroder (1965) further clarified this 
statement by demonstrating that two to five units of information 
represent suboptimal loads for processing procedures. In this 
experiment, there were only two incidental words which may 
have allowed low-level individuals to perform as effectively 
as more complex persons. However, the legitimacy of this 
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criticism can be questioned by noting (a) that the mean per-
formances on the intentional and incidental concept formation 
tasks were very low (see Tables 2 and 7), thereby indicating 
that the tasks were not "overly simple"; and (b) that Schroder 
considers complexly-integrative persons to be highly creative. 
Laughlin (1967), employing a similar procedure, analyzed the 
effect of creativity and found that high creatives exceeded 
medium and low creatives. Therefore, if Schroder's assumption 
is correct, the task should have been sufficient; and on this 
basis, our results should have been significant. 
The second plausible explanation questions the validity of 
Schroder's test. It is a confirmed fact that intelligence is 
significantly correlated with complexity (ol2 to .45); and 
therefore, several investigators postulate that the two may be 
identical. Schroder (1967) denies this by noting that his 
research discovered variations in cognitive structures while 
maintaining intelligence at a constant level and by explicating 
that intelligence is a general abil:tty while conceptual level 
varies across content areas. The present results tend to con-
firm this statement since the correlation between these two 
traits was only .11. Consequently, even thougp employing 
intelligence as a covariate eliminated the initially significant 
results, stating that the two are identical fails to fully 
satisfy our problem. 
The answer appears to involve the ability of the test to 
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actually determine a person's processing capabilities in any 
situation. Since this conceptual structure supposedly varies 
across stimulus areas, the test form administered in this 
project may have analyzed a person's ability for the wrong 
area. This is certainly a parsimonious solution to a complex 
problem but not very meaningful. The basic problem involves 
Schroder and his associates' attempt to measure some entity 
which currently refuses quantification. Their analysis that the 
relational aspects of an individual's operations upon input 
information is more significant than the pure content of the 
input is definitely a correct postulation. However, their 
measuring instrument reeks with simplicity when one realizes 
that its purpose is to analyze a complex entity that constantly 
varies. Consequently, their endeavor is noteworthy but 
certainly one that does not even approach the final solution. 
For the variable of information load, the results demon-
strated that a curvilinear relationship exists between quantity 
of relevant material and performance on the intentional concept 
formation task. This suggests that an input load of eight 
concept exemplars, in contrast to only six, offers the subject 
additional cues which may be employed in the categorization of 
stimuli. This effect is similar to that discovered by Bourne 
and Haygood (1961) and is actually a further extension of 
Walker and Bourne's (1961) distinction between the two uses of 
the word "redund&ncy". In this experiment, the relevant 
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redundant information did not require the subject to employ 
additional information in the classification of material nor 
did it necessarily permit the participant to employ any one of 
several dimensions but it actually increased the identification 
(or saliency) of the concept by repeating it through added 
exemplars. 
However, this rate of improvement did not continue for 
loads of ten exemplars which, in fact, produced a decrement in 
performance. Even though this decline was not significant, the 
overall trend analysis indicated that the larger input may 
represent an overloading of incoming information. In this 
instance, the individual is not able to assimilate the par-
ticular quantity of material in a specified time period; and 
therefore, fails to utilize the additional cues that could be 
at his disposal. In actuality, the overloading condition causes 
a "jamming" of information systems, prohibits normal function-
ing, and thus, decreases concept identification. Streufert 
and Driver (1965) concluded that excessive information loads 
decrease differentiation and integration and Garner (1962) 
found that information transmission initially increases and 
then declines as the load becomes larger. Lanzetta and Roby 
(1957) similarly determined that a decrement occurs in process-
ing highly complex information, while Hyman (195.3) certified 
that reaction time increases as input in bits increases. In 
conclusion, the suggestion can be.formulated that further 
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experimentation on intentional concept identification should 
include stimulus lists of eight words instead of six to permit 
maximum performance. This may promote intentional concept 
formation as a better measure than currently accepted in 
learning research. 
On incidental concept formation, the prediction that added 
quantities of irrelevant information decrease identification 
was substantiated. Since on this task, the intentional concept 
words were processed as irrelevant material and the incidental 
exemplars as relevant input, this effect augments Bourne and 
Haygood's (1959) formulation that redundant irrelevant infor-
mation increases the saliency of the irrelevant cues and thus 
limits performance. In the same realm, Murdock's (1965) 
''limited capacity" hypothesis lends some explanatory assistance 
by theorizing that a constant amount of material can be retained 
or learned in a constant period of time. Likewise, Wolfgang 
(1967) confirmed the assumption that learning rate decreases 
with increased amounts of irrelevant input. This suggests that 
since an individual's storage capabilities may possess limit-
ations, a subject stores only relevant information and therefore 
is unable to recall later requested incidental material. 
Laughlin (1967) and Laughlin, Doherty, and Dunn (1968) like-
wise found that stimulus lists of six nouns allow efficient 
performance on incidental concept formation. 
Regarding the effect of authoritarianism, the findings 
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showed that no differences occurred between groups on inten-
tional concept identification. This confirmed the hypothesis 
that all levels should demonstrate equal proficiency in 
learning basic material where instructional stimuli are 
explicitly stated, where presentation of information is clear, 
and where no cognitive shifts are required. In contrast, low 
authoritative individuals performed significantly better than 
other persons on incidental concept formation. Since subjects 
were required to shift from an intentional-learning set to an 
incidental concept attainment task, these results confirm 
Rokeach's (1948) discovery that relatively high F persons 
exhibit an inability of shifting from established sets. Like-
wise, these people maintain strict rigidity in their thinking, 
denoting that the subject would focus his attention only on 
the relevant information, would immediately screen out non-
essential input during presentation, and therefore would be 
unable to complete the incidental task. 
This trend continued when intelligence and cognitive 
complexity were employed as covariates. In the first case, the 
difference was less significant indicating that the cognitive 
style measured by the Authoritarianism Scale overlapped with 
that ability analyzed by the intelligence test. This effect 
was particularily noticeable in the multiple-range comparisons 
wher~ the low group differed from the medium but not from the 
high group. With integrative abi~ity as covaT.iate, the level 
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of significance was only minimally affected. This denoted that 
the two tests concentrated on two basically unrelated processes. 
This latter conclusion was further supported with the corre-
lation coefficient being only -.20, confirming Schroder's 
(1967) contention that the relationship between authoritarianism 
and cognitive structure is anything but clear-cut. 
For intentional concept formation, intelligence was the 
only personality variable that had a significant effect which 
coincides with the findings of Laughlin, Doherty, and Dunn 
(1968). Comprehension of this conclusion may occur by realizing 
that intentional learning procedures closely resemble those 
of the academic situation and that Wallach and Kogan (1965) 
proposed that intelligence is a direct predictor of academic 
achievement. In the same manner, intelligence significantly 
affected performance on incidental concept formation and recall 
of incidental stimuli. This result replicates the findings 
of Laughlin and his associates (1968) and substantially 
indicates that the ability to form, identify, and recall 
relationships for high school students is highly dependent 
upon intelligence. It also presents the possibility that this 
type of task taps an individual's processes for storing and 
retrieving information more than his procedures for processing 
input data; and that if intelligence basically represents the 
ability to store and retrieve material, the effect on both 
types of Jearning wm1J.d be sign~ ficant. 
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The interaction between information input and intelligence 
on incidental learning offers little insight into the processes 
entailed since the only difference occurred between the low 
level-high intelligence group and the remaining groups. This 
simply suggests highly intelligent persons are capable of 
efficiently processing, storing, and retrieving minimal loads of 
information better than less intelligent people with larger 
input lists. 
In general, this experiment demonstrated that intentional 
and incidental learning are not dependent upon the integrative 
ability of the individual but do rely upon the amount of stimuli 
presented for processing in a limited time period. The the-
oretical explanation forwarded by Deese (1964) received some 
confirmation since additional intentional words should assist 
in the development of numerous similar representational re-
sponses; and assuming the accuracy of Nurdock's (1965) "limited 
capacity" formulation, these intentional representations should 
restrict those for incidental matter and subsequently degrade 
performance. Statements by various investigators (Miller & 
Lakso, 1964; Wray, 1967; Schneider & Kintz, 1967) noting the 
element of attention in learning and retention and specifically 
Plenderleith and Postman's (1956) position that success in 
incidental learning corresponds with a person's ability to 
maintain attention on multiple phases of the information input 
were tentatively supported by the fact that low authoritative 
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individuals were more proficient in their identifications than 
ether participants in the project. This report also affirmed 
the role of intelligence in the analysis of both types of 
learning and emphasized that all future experimentation must 
recognize and control the presence of this factor. Negligence 
on this point suggests that some past research might be sus-
ceptible to criticism. 
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